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Cognitive, Structural, and Behaviour: The Deadlocked Situation in The Negotiation for Resolving Conflict Between Russia and Ukraine (2022-2025)

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Abstract

This paper examines recent negotiations regarding the conflict between Russia and Ukraine. The conflict escalated into a full-scale war in 2022 following Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Using qualitative descriptive study and document analysis using Faure's deadlock framework, this research identifies several indicators which show the negotiation between Russia and Ukraine for resolving their conflict has reached a deadlocked situation. This research also found that several factors such as cognitive, structural, and behavioural factor is causing the deadlock within the negotiations. The findings suggest that these factors are creating a condition where no substantive result and repeated arguments happened, which is indicators that the negotiation has reached a deadlocked condition. These findings also give implications towards the negotiation dynamics between two party, suggesting several strategies needed to overcome the deadlock within the negotiations. This research contributes to the limited amount of discourse regarding the negotiation conditions that occurred between Russia and Ukraine for resolving their conflict, offering a new perspective by applying Faure's indicators and factors such as Cognitive, Structural, and Behaviour towards this issue.

KEYWORDS

russia; ukraine; war; negotiation; deadlock.

Introduction

On February 24, 2022, after years of tension between Russia and Ukraine, there was a large-scale invasion done by Russian military forces into Ukrainian territory with the troops crossing into Ukraine through Belarus in the north, Russia in the east, and Crimea in the south. Russian President Vladimir Putin justified the invasion as a special military operation aimed at protecting pro-Russian communities in Donbas and for the demilitarization and denazification of Ukraine (Mälksoo, 2023). This invasion was then followed by an annexation attempt, where in late September 2022, Russia signed an annexation agreement recognizing Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia as part of the Russian Federation (Sauer & Harding, 2022).

This conflict has severely affected both countries. Since the war started in 2022 and until 2025, it is estimated that around 60 to 100 thousand Ukrainian troops have been killed and around more than 250 thousand Russian troops have been killed due to the war (Sauer, 2025). In addition, there are also casualties from civilians living in Ukraine, where based on data from the UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission (HRMMU) in Ukraine, currently around 12 thousand Ukrainian civilians have been killed and 29 thousand people have been injured due to the war (Janowski, 2025). This war also affected the economy of both countries, where Russia's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) fell to -1.3% at the start of the war but has since recovered to 3.6% in the last two years (Inman, 2025). Meanwhile, Ukraine's GDP has fallen to -36% in the summer of 2022 before ending the year with a decline of -28.3% before bouncing back to 5.3% in 2023 and 3% in 2024.

The war between Russia and Ukraine has a direct impact globally through global food instability (Mbah & Wasum, 2022). The invasion has made it impossible for both countries to meet global food commodities. It is estimated that Russia and Ukraine are major suppliers to the global food market and together accounted for 12% of global food trade between 2019 and 2021 (Akhand, 2024). However, the invasion has hampered food exports from Ukraine, such as wheat, to countries in need. This was further worsened when Russia blockaded the Black Sea port in Ukraine, which is one of the largest places for Ukraine to export its commodities, including food commodities. This resulted in disruptions to the food commodity supply chain, which triggered price increases globally.

On the other hand, the war between Russia and Ukraine has also had a negative impact on global energy stability and impacted European countries the most (Bukhari, 2024). Russia is a major supplier of natural gas, coal, and energy to European countries. In 2021, Russia is estimated to supply 157 billion cubic meters of gas to the European Union, which is about 43% of the total gas imported by EU countries (Keliauskaite et al., 2025). The war has disrupted critical energy infrastructure, leading to a decrease in the flow of natural gas and energy to European countries that are heavily dependent on Russian exports. Then, the sanctions imposed by the European Union on Russian oil imports from the sea have changed the global energy trade. This has led to an increase in energy prices and instability in the international energy market. It is estimated that there will be a 30% increase in prices for people's energy consumption, especially in countries in the European region (Yanatma, 2025).

Given the extensive negative impacts on both countries, as well as at the regional and global levels, several attempts have been undertaken by both parties to resolve the conflict. However, there have not been any framework agreed upon by both parties to resolve the conflict and the conflict has been ongoing still. Therefore, this article argues that the negotiation between Russia and Ukraine has reached a deadlocked situation. Dean G. Pruitt defines deadlock as a situation where neither party appears to be willing or able to give in (Pruitt, 1981). Pruitt also goes on to explain that actors experience deadlock when the level of demand in negotiations moves closer to the limit, resulting in higher resistance to further concessions. This definition also aligned with Guy Olivier Faure concept of deadlock situation within negotiation where he defined deadlock as a situation that occurs when neither party involved in the negotiation can make any concessions or steps that can trigger the dynamics of the negotiation, either actions or words (Faure, 2005).

Based on this understanding, this research produced a central question: What causes the negotiations between Russia and Ukraine to reach a deadlocked situation? The answer of those statements above will provide research significance practically and theoretically. Practically, a deepened understanding of this problem can give more insight for those involved in negotiations between both countries or even third-party for more effective strategies to break the deadlock and formulate an agreement for Russia and Ukraine to resolve their conflict. Theoretically, the exploration of the Russia and Ukraine situation within their negotiation based on a new perspective approach will result in an increasing academic discourse for the issue.

There are a few research that discussed the situation within Russia and Ukraine negotiation for conflict resolution. On one side, there are several studies that provide several recommendations that can help negotiations for Russia and Ukraine to resolve their conflict such as the need to improve relations between the two countries before negotiating by deepening both countries understanding of the history and culture of the parties involved, and starting back-channel

talks between the two countries before starting a framework to resolve the conflict that can be agreed upon by both parties. On the other side, there is also a discussion of the failures in the negotiations result between Russia and Ukraine, but mostly focused on the negotiations that resulted in the Minsk agreement in 2014. They argue that the failure of the Minsk agreement occurred due to several factors such as the bias in the contents of the agreement towards Russia, pressure from western countries that forced Ukraine to agree to the results which made the agreement not fully implemented which gave Russia the opportunity to invade again in 2022. (For more details regarding previous studies, see: (Åtland, 2020,; Batta, 2024; Bialasiewicz, 2024; Bramsen & Svensson, 2024; Kappeler, 2014; Kimmage, 2024; Minutolo et al., 2023; Oksamytna, 2024; Terrence, 2023; Terrence, 2024; Toal, 2024; von Essen & Umland, 2023).

Unlike previous studies that primarily focus on providing recommendations for achieving successful negotiations or explaining the failure of specific outcomes, such as the Minsk Agreements, this study positions itself within the existing literature by examining the factors that have produced a persistent deadlock in negotiations between Russia and Ukraine since the conflict resumed in 2022. The novelty of the research lies in analyzing several factors that may contribute to the deadlocked situation within Russia and Ukraine negotiations for their conflict resolution and providing strategies to overcome those deadlocked negotiations. This research use of Faure indicators, factors, and strategy to overcome the deadlocked situation within Russia and Ukraine negotiation for conflict resolution has not been done by previous studies. Therefore, this research not only fills the gap in the literature of research related to situation within negotiation between Russia and Ukraine for conflict resolution, but also expand the discourse surrounding the issue.

Studies on the negotiation between Russia and Ukraine for their conflict resolution is still limited, with some researchers only focusing on giving recommendations on how to conduct a successful negotiation and analyze phenomenon of a negotiation agreements results which ended in failure. The author hope that this research will fill the gap in the literature by identifying several factors that contribute to the deadlock within the negotiation itself which can help on understanding why negotiations between Russia and Ukraine is still on a deadlocked situation till right now, where there is no substantial concession or agreement for a framework to resolve conflict between both countries and also providing strategies to overcome those deadlocked negotiations.

The novelty of this study lies in its application of Guy Olivier Faure's deadlock framework to analyze the persistent negotiation stalemate between Russia and Ukraine from 2022 to 2025. Unlike previous studies that focus on negotiation outcomes, such as the Minsk Agreements, or offer normative recommendations for conflict resolution, this research examines deadlock as an ongoing negotiation condition. By regularly analyzing Faure's indicators and cognitive, structural, and behavioral factors, this study provides a new analytical perspective on why negotiations remain stalled and proposes strategies to overcome the deadlock.

Methods

This research was conducted with a qualitative approach which is a descriptive study using document analysis as the main data collection technique. The data that will be taken and used in this research is data in the form of news, official statements, and journal articles discussing the negotiation from both countries from 2022 to 2025. The researcher will also use secondary data sources, namely data sources that already exist and are created by previous researchers who have

discussed the research topic (Grønmo, 2020). These secondary data sources can appear in the form of written documents such as journals, academic literature, articles, books, and news that discuss the conflict and the negotiation process that occurred between Russia and Ukraine. This research use Faure's indicators and factors were as analytical coding to show the negotiation is deadlocked and several factors such as cognitive, behavioural, and structural contribute to the deadlocked situation and provide strategies to overcome the deadlock based on these factors. Faure's indicators are used to analyze the negotiations and indicates that the negotiation is currently deadlocked. Several factors such as cognitive, structural, and behavioural is used to provide the causes that create the deadlock situation within Russia and Ukraine negotiations. From this analysis, the author interpret data on research that is not only intended for description alone, but will also try to explain by developing further analysis of the general description of the research using the theory framework related to the case.

The theoretical framework that will be used by the author is the one developed by Guy Olivier Faure about the deadlocked situation within a negotiation. Faure identifies several indicators that indicates the negotiation is in a deadlocked situation and also several factors that create the deadlock situation itself (Faure, 2005). Faure argues that there are four indicators that indicates the negotiation is in a deadlocked situation. First is when the meeting between the two parties lacks substance where no real steps are taken, such as concessions, exchange of information, or giving of advice that occurs in the negotiation. Second is that the answers given by the parties involved in the negotiation are so complicated that they become completely incomprehensible. Third is that the same arguments and explanations are repeated endlessly as the negotiation progresses. Fourth is when one of the parties involved in the negotiation pretends or states that they cannot attend the next meeting, by giving an acceptable reason and not using unpleasant words or showing signs of dissatisfaction.

Faure then explains that there are several factors that creates the deadlock situation within the negotiation itself, such as cognitive, structural, and behavioural factors (Faure, 2005). Cognitive factors arise in deadlocks in negotiations when both parties perceive the situation differently. This is because often neither party is aware that the other party has a different view of the end goal in their negotiations because neither party openly states their goal during the negotiation. Structural factors relate to the parties involved in the negotiation and the internal resources available to resolve the issues at stake. Faure argues that in a deadlocked situation, no further concessions can be made where perhaps one party has reached a safe point or perhaps small concessions will not work because they are not enough to change the attitude of the other party. In addition, there are also situations where nothing more can be given, because doing so would cause a destabilization of the entire equilibrium of the system. The last one is behavioural factors, where deadlock can also be the direct result of mistaken expectations, broken promises, or an exchange that one party deems fair and the other rejects.

Result and Discussion

Overview of Corporate Sustainability Initiatives by Southeast History of Russia and Ukraine negotiation to resolve their conflict (2022-2025)

The first round of negotiation started when Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelenskyy and Belarusian president Alexander Lukashenko agreed on 27 February that a Ukrainian delegation would meet with Russian officials on the Belarusian border, near the Pripyat River, without

preconditions (Zinets, 2022). The talks between Russia and Ukraine began on 28 February, and during the negotiations Ukraine's main focus is for a ceasefire and withdrawal of Russia forces in Ukraine. (Hopkins, 2022). However, at the end of the meetings both parties did not reach any agreement to resolve the conflict but both are willing to continue to negotiate.

The second round of the negotiations continued on March 3, 2022, where the two delegations met on the Belarusian border with Poland. Both sides wanted a possible ceasefire for evacuating civilians. At the meeting, both parties agreed that they would open a humanitarian corridor for the evacuation of civilians affected by the conflict (ABC News, 2022). However, in the discussion on resolving the conflict, the positions of the two countries have not changed, which means that the negotiations did not produce a joint agreement to end the conflict. Russia demands include Ukraine recognition of Russia hold on Crimea, independence for the separatist-controlled areas of Donetsk and Luhansk, as well as "de-militarisation" and "de-nazification". However, Ukraine itself stated that they don't want to discuss any of these demands before Russia agreed to implement ceasefire and withdraw its forces from Ukraine region. Even though there is no agreement to resolve the conflict, both parties are willing to continue the negotiations (Aris, 2022).

The third round of negotiations was continued in the same month, namely March 7, 2022, where on that date the delegations from Russia and Ukraine met again to discuss resolving the conflict between the two parties (Belton, 2022). However, the meeting again did not produce an agreement between the two parties. Russia's demands mostly have not changed, namely that Ukraine must change the constitution that guarantees neutrality, accept that Crimea is part of Russia, and recognize that the Donetsk and Luhansk regions are independent state territories. In return, Russia will halt its military operations in a moment. In the end, the meeting ended without any agreement between both parties involved.

The fourth round of negotiations started between the Russian and Ukrainian delegations involving Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, and Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba and Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu as mediators (Açıklan, 2025). This meeting took place at the Antalya Diplomacy Forum on March 10, 2022. On one side, Ukraine is pressing on ceasefire and resolving humanitarian issues, while the other side Russia keep demanding its guarantees such as neutrality and recognition of Crimea, and Donetsk and Luhansk as independent region. The meeting ended without any agreement between the two parties.

The fifth round of negotiations started on March 14, 2022 where both delegations met via video conference. Then, in March 15, 2022 both parties discussed the "15-point plan" draft (Al Jazeera, 2022). Some of the plan included the withdrawal of Russian troops in Ukraine and the certainty of international military assistance to Ukraine if Russia reactivates its military action, with the guarantee that Ukraine will not join or affiliate with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) (Seddon et al., 2022). Additionally, Ukraine is proposing to "compartmentalize" the Crimea issue, which would allow both sides to debate it in a different context following a formal truce. Ukraine also would protect and uphold the cultural sensitivities of the Russian-speaking minority, including their language rights, according to the draft agreement. However, on March 17, 2022 the negotiations ended with no mutual agreement between the two parties for the 15-point plan draft. Even though the talks again were resumed on March 21, 2022 they still could not produce an agreement on a resolution of the conflict between the two parties. This lack of results marks the end of the 15-point plan draft discussion between two parties.

However, this did not end the negotiation between both parties. The sixth round of negotiations between the Russian

and Ukrainian delegations started on March 29, 2022 in Istanbul, Turkey. This meeting discussed several things such as neutrality and Ukraine's claim to be a future NATO member. The result of this meeting was what is known as the "Istanbul Communiqué". The Istanbul Communiqué would proclaim Ukraine as a permanently neutral, non-nuclear state. Ukraine then would renounce any intention to join military alliances or allow foreign military bases or troops on its soil (Fischer, 2022). The UN Security Council's permanent members, including Russia, Canada, Germany, Israel, Italy, Poland, and Turkey, were also mentioned in the communiqué as potential guarantors. As a result, all guarantor nations would be obliged to assist Ukraine in restoring its security if it came under attack and asked for assistance, after consulting with Ukraine and among themselves. The proposed framework would make Ukraine permanently neutral, but it would leave open the possibility of Ukraine joining the European Union. Another clause in the communiqué urges both parties to try to settle their conflict over Crimea amicably over the course of the next ten to fifteen years.

During this period of negotiation, both Russia and Ukraine were actively exchanging drafts with each other. On April 15, there are several changes that Russia wanted within the Istanbul Communiqué (Charap & Radchenko, 2024). First, Russia is trying to amend the clause stating that guarantor states would have the autonomy to determine whether to support Ukraine in the case of an attack on their territory. Regarding that particular clause, Russia is adamant that such action may only take place in accordance with a decision that is approved by all guarantor governments, including Russia. This gives Russia the ability to veto a decision at any time. As a result, the Ukraine rejects this approach and continues to rely on the original article's formula, in which each guarantor had an independent commitment to act without first reaching a consensus.

Second, Russia is insisting on adding several articles that were not part of the Istanbul Communiqué and related to matters that Ukraine refuse to discuss, such as a requirement for Ukraine to ban fascism, Nazism, neo-Nazism, and aggressive nationalism and to repeal six Ukrainian laws (Charap & Radchenko, 2024). Third, there was extensive negotiation regarding the strength and composition of the Ukrainian military forces. Both parties continued to hold divergent views throughout the discussion process. Russia only insisted on a maximum of 85,000 soldiers, which is significantly less than the standing army Ukraine had prior to the invasion in 2022, whereas Ukraine desired a peacetime force of 250,000. Russia would only permit Ukraine to have 342 tanks, despite Ukraine's desire to retain 800 tanks. There is also disagreement about missile range; Russia demands that Ukraine only have missiles with a 40-kilometer range, while Ukraine wants missiles with a 280-kilometer range. (Charap & Radchenko, 2024).

The talks, however ended without any agreement between both parties for implementing the Istanbul Communiqué. This lack of agreements is mostly due to the following disagreements combined with the knowing of Bucha Massacre by Ukraine on April during negotiation period, and the failed push by the Russia towards Ukraine capital Kyiv. On late April, Ukraine had hardened its position, demanding a Russian withdrawal from the Donbas as a precondition to any treaty, which ended the discussion between Russia and Ukraine for the Istanbul Communiqué (Charap & Radchenko, 2024).

The meeting can be said to be the last truly substantive meeting to discuss the resolution of the conflict between Russia and Ukraine. After the "Istanbul Communiqué" discussion was stopped by the two delegations, communication in the negotiations to resolve the conflict can be said to have reached a deadlocked situation. Then, the

annexation of four Ukrainian regions by Russia in September 2022 made Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy state that talks between Russia and Ukraine are currently impossible to achieve and Ukraine still has no desire for direct negotiations with Russia. He even stated that negotiations to resolve the conflict with Russia would not be achieved as long as Russian President Vladimir Putin was still in power (Harding & Koshiw, 2022). On the other hand, Russian President Vladimir Putin stated that Russia had never refused to participate in peace talks with Ukraine and then blamed Ukraine for the failure of previous peace negotiations.

However, the negotiations between Russia and Ukraine did restart in 2025. In May 2025, the seventh round of negotiations began when representatives of both countries met in Istanbul, Türkiye, for the first time since 2022. The meeting happened due to Russia proposal for direct negotiations between Russia and Ukraine (Shamim, 2025). This is a response from a pressure from United States and an ultimatum by the Ukraine and other European countries to Russia to accept 30-day ceasefire unconditionally. Both sides send their proposal to discussed during the negotiation period. Ukraine proposed a peace deal that would include an unconditional ceasefire in the skies, on land, and at sea as a necessary foundation and prerequisite to peace negotiations, restore a permanent basis for lasting peace and security and ensure that aggression does not occur again, have strong security guarantees and not be forced to be neutral, recognize Russia's territorial gains since 2014, discuss territory issues only after a full and unconditional ceasefire, and gradually lift some sanctions imposed on Russia (Balmforth & Maclean, 2025). A comprehensive ceasefire lasting at least 30 days, the return of all prisoners detained by both sides and Ukrainian children taken into Russian-held territory, and a meeting between Russian President Vladimir Putin and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy were the next steps in Ukraine's proposed roadmap for achieving a lasting peace settlement.

On the other hand, Russia also sends a memorandum aimed at settling the conflict before negotiations begin. It calls for international recognition of Crimea and the Donbas region as part of Russia, a promise that Ukraine will protect the rights, freedoms, and interests of its Russian speakers, the designation of Russian as Ukraine's official language, a prohibition on the propaganda or glorification of Nazism and neo-Nazism, and the lifting of all restrictions on the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Barreto & Gormezano, 2025). Additionally, Russia required that Ukraine remain neutral, which implies that it would not join any military coalitions or alliances, prohibit any military action by third parties on Ukrainian territory, and forbid the establishment of foreign military soldiers, bases, or infrastructure in the Ukraine region. Russia persisted in its demand that nuclear weapons be directly prohibited from being accepted, transported, or used in Ukraine, as well as that Ukraine's armed forces, weaponry, and military hardware be limited. Economically, Russia also asked to lift all existing sanctions by Ukraine against Russia and a pledge to not impose a new sanction against Russia, waiver of claims with Ukraine in connection with damage caused by hostilities between both parties, and restoration of diplomatic and economic relations with Ukraine, which include gas transits.

Russia also gives to ceasefire option for Ukraine. The first option is to withdraw the Ukraine army from the Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia regions (Barreto & Gormezano, 2025). When the Ukraine military begins to withdraw from the conflicted territories, a 30-day ceasefire will be established and the full withdrawal must be completed within 30 days of the ceasefire. The second option is a lot more comprehensive, which consists of a ban on the redeployment of the Ukraine armed forces, except for movements for withdrawal to an agreed distance from the borders of Russia, halting all western arms supply and the provision of intelligence

data to Ukraine, exclude any military presence of third countries, stopping foreign specialists participation in military operations of Ukraine, cancelling martial law established by Ukraine when the war starts, creating a bilateral centre for monitoring and controlling the ceasefire, demobilisation in Ukraine to achieve a ceasefire, and others such as amnesty for political prisoners, and releasing military personnel and civilians from Russia.

The meetings did not produce any substantial agreement between both parties. During the first negotiation started on May 16, both parties only agreed on exchanging 1000 prisoners of war each (Lukiv & Shevchenko, 2025). The second negotiation that started on June 2, only lasted an hour where they both agreed on exchanging more prisoners of war and return the bodies of 12,000 dead soldiers. However, both parties are unchanging and unwilling to compromise anything regarding their demands for ceasefire or even a framework to end the conflict.

Indicators that appeared during negotiations between Russia and Ukraine for resolving their conflict

Based on the foregoing overview of negotiation efforts since 2022, this study identifies several recurring patterns indicating that negotiations between Russia and Ukraine have reached a persistent deadlock, primarily due to a lack of substantive progress and the repetition of demands by both parties. Firstly, there is a lack of substance when negotiation between both parties started in 2022 and lasted until 2025. During their negotiation round, there has no significant agreement made between them, which can be seen where the only agreement they achieve is humanitarian corridor, prisoner exchange, and return of soldier bodies to their respective countries. On the other side, there is lack of concession from both parties to agreed upon a ceasefire or a framework to resolve the conflict between them. There are also repeated demands made by both parties which can not be fulfilled. Russia demands Ukraine to withdraw from the region already claimed by Russia military forces and recognize them either as independent countries or as Russia's territory. Russia also demanding Ukraine to stay as a neutral country where they can not join any military alliance, especially NATO and they also demand to limit the military force Ukraine have. On the other side, since the war began Ukraine is not recognizing any claims of territory Russia had since the war started including Crimea region and they also always demanding Russia to withdraw their troops back to the line before the war started and also ask for a security guarantee in case of them being attacked again by Russia. This unchanging demand that are unwilling to be fulfilled by both parties and also lack of any concession regarding effort to resolve the conflict is indicating that their negotiation is now on a deadlocked situation.

Factors that create a deadlocked situation within Russia and Ukraine negotiation for resolving their conflict

There are several factors which caused the negotiation between Russia and Ukraine for their conflict resolution reached a deadlocked situation. First, is regarding the cognitive factor where it is seen that both parties perceive the situation differently about their negotiations. On one side, Ukraine perceived the negotiations between them and Russia as a chance to create a ceasefire between them during conflict to stabilize and reduce the casualties and losses from war. Therefore, the main purpose for Ukraine to have their negotiation with them is to create a condition of ceasefire first, before discussing anything long-term to resolve their conflict. On the other side, Russia perceived the negotiations as a way to win them the fight with Ukraine early and focused more on long term goals and settlement for the conflict. This different perspective of both parties regarding the negotiations itself

makes them have different expectations and goals before the negotiation even started, which makes the negotiation reached a deadlocked situation.

Second, Structural factors also contributed to the deadlocked situation that occurred within the negotiations between Russia and Ukraine for their conflict resolution. As mentioned before, structural factors related to the resources both parties have and their willingness to negotiate based on the resource they have. A deadlocked situation occurs when both parties have no concession left due to one party has reached a safe point or any small concessions will not matter because it will not change the other party attitude or there are also situations where nothing more can be given, because doing so would cause a destabilization of the entire equilibrium of the system. This is precisely what happened during the negotiation between Russia and Ukraine to resolve their conflict. Structural factors affect negotiation between both countries (Onyebuchi, 2024). During negotiations both parties have demands towards each other but they also unwilling to concede to the demands especially the one related to resources. On one side, Russia is unwilling to accept Ukraine demand to withdraw their troops towards the position before the war started, because it will make all the effort and resources spent for this war wasted. In 2024 Russia spent around 35% from its total expenditure as military expenses or around 6.9% of its GDP and in 2025, they planned to increased it by 3% (Cooper, 2025). For the equipment side, it is estimated that from January 2024 to April 2025 the war costed Russia 1,233 Armored Fighting Vehicles, 308 Armored Personnel Carriers, 3238 Infantry Fighting Vehicles, 182 Infantry Mobility Vehicles, 12 Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) Vehicles, 174 Multiple Rocket Launchers, 320 Self-Propelled Artillery, 1946 Tanks, 130 Towed Artillery, and 1,160 Trucks, Vehicles, and Jeeps (Jones & McCabe, 2025). Also, the war costed Russia around 250,000 fatalities and around 950,000 Russian soldiers have been killed and wounded since the war began in 2022 (Sauer, 2025).

On the other side, Ukraine is rejecting any of the Russia demand regarding acknowledging the Russia claim of the invaded region, such as Crimea, Donetsk, Luhans, and Zaporizhzhia. The rejection happened because any of concession regarding their territory is perceived as losing the war and threatening Ukraine sovereignty. Also, giving up the territory means not only giving up the land, but also its resources which reinforce their resolve to claim the land (Baranowski et al., 2025). Russia seized possession of more than \$12.5 trillion worth of Ukrainian gas and minerals within months after occupying the territory in 2022. Over 56% of Ukraine's hard coal deposits, which are among the greatest in the world and are estimated to be worth \$12 trillion, were among the most profitable assets (Muggah & Rohozinski, 2025). Additionally, by the end of 2022, Russia controlled between 50 and 100 percent of Ukraine's reserves of lithium, tantalum, cesium, and strontium—metals essential to green energy technologies and the defense sector—as well as 20 percent of the country's gas fields and 11 percent of its oil fields, the second largest in Europe and valued at about \$85 billion.

Another point is regarding homes for Ukraine citizens, where more than 3.7 million people are internally displaced and 6.9 million people refuge to other countries as the result (Tank, 2022). Therefore, agreeing to giving up any territories to Russia not only will make them lose valuable territories and resource but they action will also caused millions of Ukraine citizens permanently displaced. Another point is about Russia demand to reduce Ukraine military forces. This demand is also rejected by Ukraine because the military forces is a resource they need right now and the future in case Russia is not keeping their agreement in check and continue invading Ukraine.

Third, behavioural factors also caused a deadlocked

situation within Russia and Ukraine negotiation to resolve their conflict. Russia and Ukraine have mistaken expectations regarding the negotiations. On one side, Russia is more expecting to have an agreement to end the conflict during negotiations and therefore always demanding long term demand during negotiations. On the other side, Ukraine have expectation towards negotiation that focused more on humanitarian and ceasefire to stop the ongoing war and violence in their territories. This makes them have different behaviour during negotiations, where they reject each other demands because it does not align with their expectation. Second, is regarding broken promises between Russia and Ukraine itself which can be traced back to their history. The most known ones are about Budapest Memorandum and Minsk Agreement. Budapest Memorandum is signed by Ukraine, Russia, United States, and United Kingdom. The main reason this agreement signed by all the parties is to give Ukraine security assurance in exchange of giving up their nuclear weapon capabilities (Hynek & Šenk, 2025). For instance, one of the Budapest Memorandum's provisions calls for respecting Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity as well as refraining from threatening or using force against the signatories' political independence or territorial integrity. However, this is then violated by Russia in 2014, where they invaded Ukraine and took Crimea by force. Another promise broken is regarding Minsk Agreement, which consists of two phases. The first one signed in September 2014 and the second one signed in February 2015. This agreement is negotiated and signed by Ukraine, Russia and Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) (Ellison et al., 2023). The main point purpose of this agreement is to end the Donbas war fought between armed Russian separatist groups which backed by Russia forces and armed forces of Ukraine. However, the constant violation of ceasefire, and vague language within the article, and disagreements between both parties regarding sequence of implementation makes the agreement not implemented by both parties. This dynamic has further deepened mutual distrust, causing them having a hard stance to compromise on anything when the negotiation started. This resulted in lack of concession and results from negotiation and therefore is in a deadlocked situation.

Third, regarding unfair exchange of demands is also apparent during negotiations. Both sides are asking unfair demands towards each other during negotiations. For example, during the latest negotiation in 2025 both parties have unfair demands towards each other regarding for ceasefire. Russia demanded that Ukraine remove the Ukrainian army from disputed areas, prohibit the redeployment of the Ukrainian armed forces except for demobilization to a predetermined distance from Russia's borders, stop all Western arms supplies and intelligence data to Ukraine, prohibit any military presence of third countries, prevent foreign specialists from participating in Ukrainian military operations, cancel the martial law which Ukraine had imposed when the conflict began, establish a bilateral center for monitoring and controlling the ceasefire, demobilize the Ukrainian military personnel and civilians from Russia, among other things.

Ukraine also had unfair demands during negotiations with Russia. Ukraine demanded to have unconditional ceasefire in the sky, on land and at sea as a necessary background and prerequisite for peace negotiations, restore a permanent basis for lasting peace and security and to ensure that aggression does not occur again, must have robust security guarantees, not forced to be neutral, territorial gains made by Russia since 2014 are not recognized and territory issues are discussed only after full and unconditional ceasefire, and some sanctions imposed to Russia may be lifted gradually. It is apparent that both demands are on the extreme ends

within one another and it is hard to have any room to negotiate regarding those demands. This resulted yet again towards another lack of concession or any cooperation to create an agreement between one another, which created a deadlocked situation within the negotiation.

Strategies to overcome the deadlock within Russia and Ukraine negotiation for resolving their conflict

There are several strategies to overcome the deadlocked situation within the negotiation that are caused by these factors. First, is the strategy to address the cognitive factor where both Russia and Ukraine perceive the negotiation differently. To overcome this, it is better to have an activity to reframe the perspective for both parties so that they both have the same aligned perspective regarding the issue during negotiation. For example, a change in the perception of the terms of the deal, their value, and their significance during the negotiation between them may help to restart a stalled process within the negotiation. Another example is to reevaluate both perceptions which already reached a mutually hostile image between one another. The party that wants to have its image modified should take initiatives that are clearly voluntary and costly. These initiatives should be repeated for some period of time, even if not initially reciprocated. Such initiatives can be in the form of voluntary ceasefire, hold the movement of their military forces, or extending communication between both parties. Another strategy is to add empathy towards both parties involved. Introducing this reframing action by someone who is not involved in the conflict's origin increases the likelihood that it will be accepted. When both sides consent to participate in such activities through training sessions, particular strategies like role reversal can help both parties gain some empathy. Each side is asked to convey the other party's perspective and provide evidence to support its demands rather than outlining its own and arguing for its own interests to prevail. Also, promoting empathy does not put the interests of the person in question at risk; rather, it essentially helps that party in comprehending the entire situation, including the motives and interests of the other party, without requiring that party to share those interests.

The second strategy is to address the structural factor that create the deadlock situation. To get around this, it is preferable for both sides to avoid concentrating on the matter that is deemed to be too important, such as disputed territory and armed troops. In these situations, the goal is to steer clear of this symbolic or psychological obsession while concurrently offering a compromise with recompense on another matter. By adding issues to the negotiation, the scope or form of the set of concerns is altered, allowing all parties to search for packages or agreements that incorporate trade-offs that will contribute to a mutually agreeable solution. The bargaining process may resume with this new prospect in mind.

This strategy is required since treating each problem independently would result in deadlock. The overall assessment may be favorable enough to persuade both parties to resume talks because the costs and rewards are not equal for each party. Introducing a mediator to the negotiation is also another approach to break the deadlock caused by structural and power imbalances. A mediator can improve communication, boost the desire to come to a consensus, standardize the parties' perspectives, offer initiatives, and make changes to the issue structure. It should be mentioned, nevertheless, that there are disadvantages to a mediator's intervention, particularly if the mediator has a strong sense of self-interest.

The third strategy is for the behavioural factor. Mistaken expectations, broken promises, and unfair exchange of demands appeared during negotiations between Russia and Ukraine. For this problem, the strategy to overcome this involve offers in the form of exchanges of concessions or the sending

of decipherable signals of goodwill. By providing some new reason for hope, the negotiation is able to be restarted. Another strategy is to introducing new information, unknown data, or the account of an unexpected event. This strategy can create a change of attitude that entails a revision of the other sides security point and more cooperative behavior, thus enabling the whole process to restart on a new basis. There is also the strategy that use time as its basis, where both parties take a recess in the hope that as time goes by tension will ease, people will cool down, and their attitudes will be modified. Another strategy that utilizes time is to temporarily set aside the sensitive issues such as territory dispute and moving it to a more favorable moment in the negotiation.

Conclusion

Ever since the Russia invasion towards Ukraine started in 2022, both parties are trying to resolve the conflict through negotiation. However, all these negotiations did not give any substantial result to end the conflict between both parties. This research argues that as of 2022-2025 the negotiation between Russia and Ukraine to resolve their conflict is in a deadlocked situation. The deadlocked situation is proven by several indicators appeared during negotiations between both parties. Firstly, the negotiation resulted in lack of substance where both parties did not achieve any agreements regarding any solution or framework to resolve the conflict. This is evident in the outcomes of negotiations since 2022, most of which have failed to produce any substantive agreements. Where agreements were reached, they were limited to temporary and humanitarian measures, such as prisoner exchanges, humanitarian corridors, and the repatriation of fallen soldiers' bodies. Another indicator that appeared during negotiation is the repeated arguments and demands by both parties. Russia demanding Ukraine to become a neutral state, withdraw their troops, reduce their military, banning third countries military assistance, recognizing invaded territories as Russia, and removing any economic sanctions to end the conflict. On the other side, Ukraine demanded that they need to have immediate ceasefire, creating security guarantees from Russia and other countries such as United States to protect Ukraine in case of them being attacked, need to withdraw Russia military forces towards the border before 2022 invasion started, rejecting any claims by Russia regarding its territories, and humanitarian help towards its citizens. These two indicators prove that negotiation between both parties has reached a deadlocked situation where they are unable to make any concessions or steps that can trigger the dynamics of the negotiation, either actions or words.

Several factors contributed to the deadlocked situation within Russia and Ukraine negotiation for resolving their conflict. All these factors influencing the negotiation and steered them towards a deadlocked situation. First is

regarding cognitive factors, where both parties perceive the situation differently about their negotiations. Ukraine priority within negotiation is to reach immediate ceasefire before discussing any settlement or proposals to solve the conflict. Meanwhile, Russia main focus during negotiations is to push their proposal in the form of long term demands to end the conflict. Second is about structural factor where they do not have any concession left due to one side has reached a safe point and nothing more can be given, because doing so would cause a destabilization of the entire equilibrium of the system. In this case, Russia and Ukraine did not have any concession regarding the discussion on military and territorial resources such as Ukraine demand for Russia to withdraw all the way to the territory line before it started and Russia demand to recognize invaded territory as Russia and for Ukraine to have their military forces withdraw, reduced, and banned all military cooperation with third country. Those demands are unacceptable by both parties because those demands threaten their resources and therefore both parties are unwilling to conceded on any demands. Third and last factor is about behavioural factors influencing the negotiation towards a deadlocked situation. Both parties have a more aggressive and distrustful behaviour during negotiations due to mistaken expectations during negotiations, false hope from previous agreement such as Budapest Memorandum and Minsk agreement, and unfair exchange of demands from both parties.

Several strategies can be used to overcome the deadlocked caused by these factors. These strategies can be done at the same time and not restricted by one another. First is strategy to overcome cognitive factor, such as an activity to reframe the perspective for both parties, changing both perceptions which already reached a mutually hostile image between one another, and inducing empathy towards the parties involved. Second, is strategies to overcome the deadlock based on structural factors, such as not focusing on the issue considered to be too crucial (in this case, disputed territory and military forces), adding issues to the negotiation to change the scope or shape of the set of issues, or adding a mediator that can facilitate communication, increase the motivation to reach an agreement, homogenize the parties viewpoints, suggest initiatives, and propose modifications. Third, are the strategies for behavioral factors, such as making offers in the form of concession exchanges or sending clear signals of goodwill, presenting fresh information, unidentified data, or an account of an unexpected event, or even taking a break in the hopes that tension will eventually subside or that delicate issues, like territory demands, will be temporarily put aside and moved to a more advantageous point in the negotiation. Overall, negotiations between Russia and Ukraine remain in a state of deadlock, driven by the interaction of cognitive, structural, and behavioral factors, and this study argues that targeted strategies addressing these dimensions can contribute to overcoming the deadlock within their negotiations.

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